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Introduction
The clinical diagnosis of patients with disorders of 
consciousness is extremely difficult, leading to a 
high rate of misdiagnosis (Schnakers et  al., 2009). 
There are several reasons for these difficulties. First, 
the results of patients’ clinical assessment are highly 
dependent on the way clinicians search for behav-
iour at the bedside, and in particular on the details of 
the coma scale used. Among the many coma scales 
presently available, only a few explicitly incorpo-
rate diagnostic criteria differentiating vegetative 
state (VS) from minimally conscious state (MCS) in 
behavioural terms (Seel et al., 2010). Even if clini-
cians use appropriate scales, some behaviours, such 
as blinking to visual threat (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 
2008) or grimacing to pain (Zeman, 1997), remain 
equivocal and are difficult to interpret as being either 
purely reflex, or as signs of residual conscious per-
ception of external stimuli. The intrinsic problem of 
behavioural evaluation of the level of consciousness 
in VS and MCS is that the clinician is required to 
infer the presence or absence of consciousness based 
on behaviour, in the absence of a ‘gold standard’ 
verbal report (Boly et  al., 2009a). Furthermore, 
behavioural responsiveness can be biased by a num-
ber of additional confounds including the quality of 
the patients’ language comprehension, willingness 
to collaborate, availability of motor control, and so 
on (Boly et al., 2007).
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Taken together, the above issues illustrate the 
challenges attending the behavioural diagnosis 
of patients with disorders of consciousness, and 
explain the increased interest of clinical commu-
nity in the use of neuroimaging techniques to com-
plement bedside behavioural diagnosis (Rafii and 
Brewer, 2010). In the present article, we will review 
neuroimaging studies that have been performed in 
patients in VS and MCS, focusing on the distinction 
between so-called ‘passive’ and ‘active’ paradigms. 
After briefly discussing non-neuroimaging passive 
approaches, we will discuss how mechanistic and 
theoretical perspectives on the fundamental prob-
lem of relating brain activity and consciousness 
could help unify passive and active approaches in a 
coherent diagnostic procedure. We will review the 
main theoretical frameworks currently available in 
this context, concluding with some potential future 
avenues of research.
Modes: passive versus active 
neuroimaging paradigms
In the last few years, advances in neuroimaging 
techniques have led to the development of several 
novel paradigms aiming at assessing the potential 
for residual cognitive functions in severely brain 
damaged patients. Putting aside the variability in 
the neuroimaging techniques and the type of stimuli 
employed, these paradigms can be classified into 
two complementary categories. Passive paradigms 
are used to investigate the patients’ brain activity 
at rest or during administration of external stimuli, 
without requiring their collaboration. Active para-
digms are used to obtain a response to command 
from the patients assessed by differential brain 
responses, by-passing motor output.
For good reasons, active paradigms have attracted 
considerable interest in the last few years. If they 
are properly designed and controlled, they can pro-
vide direct evidence for the presence of residual 
consciousness in individual brain damaged patients. 
An early example employed functional MRI (fMRI) 
assessment of the performance of mental imagery 
tasks, in order to obtain a response to command 
(Boly et  al., 2007). In this arrangement, patients 
are instructed to repetitively alternate 30 seconds 
of motor (tennis playing) imagery or spatial naviga-
tion mental imagery with 30 seconds of rest. fMRI 
data analysis then aims at detecting task-specific 
motor or spatial navigation neural activation dur-
ing the periods in which the patient was instructed 
to perform the task, as compared to periods of 
rest. This paradigm has proven able to identify the 
presence of awareness in some patients previously 
clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state 
(Owen et  al., 2006). Furthermore, it allowed for 
the first time interactive real-time communication 
using fMRI brain signals in a single brain-damaged 
patient (Monti et  al., 2010). Additional paradigms 
have been designed, using event-related potentials, 
which are more flexible and are potentially usable 
at the patients’ bedside (Schnakers et  al., 2008; 
Bekinschtein et al., 2009).
Despite their definite clinical relevance and useful-
ness, active paradigms have a number of limitations. 
Recent cohort studies have shown that only a minor-
ity of patients are able to positively respond to this 
approach – of the order of 10% (Monti et al., 2010). 
In the 90% of patients that do not respond to com-
mand in a way detectable by neuroimaging methods, 
one cannot say anything definite about the presence 
or absence of residual cognition or consciousness 
(Boly et  al., 2007). Negative findings have to be 
interpreted very cautiously for several reasons. 
Firstly, at a very general level, consciousness is not 
an all-or-none phenomenon but should rather be 
considered as a continuum (Majerus et  al., 2005; 
Seth et al., 2008) finessing any diagnosis of residual 
consciousness. Secondly, some supra-tentorial brain 
lesions could impair the patients’ ability to perform 
a selected task, for example by causing apraxia 
or neglect (Boly et  al., 2007). Brain injury could 
also lead to a certain amount of reorganization and 
plasticity, potentially resulting in the recruitment 
of other areas during the performance of a given 
cognitive task (Demertzi et al., 2010). These factors 
could lead to negative results in active neuroimaging 
paradigms, independently of the patient’s aware-
ness or vigilance levels. In addition, maintaining 
mental imagery tasks for periods of 30 s is attention 
demanding, again emphasizing the value of a posi-
tive result. However, patients with severely altered 
level of vigilance may only be able to supply tran-
sient responses to the presentation of instructions. 
A third point is that a defining feature of voluntary 
actions is that one can choose whether or not to 
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execute them (Passingham, 1995). The success of 
any active paradigm is therefore dependent on the 
desire or willingness (if the patient is aware) of the 
patient to respond (Majerus 2005). Finally, although 
one might think that a positive behavioural response 
in an active paradigm should imply a positive neu-
roimaging response, this does not always seem to be 
the case. A recent study investigating MCS patients 
(Bardin et  al., 2011) showed an absence of fMRI 
command following in patients who were able to 
show some behavioural responsiveness. Considering 
these limitations together with the observed fre-
quency of false negatives reported across fMRI 
investigations of healthy volunteers (McGonigle 
et al., 2000), the conclusion is very clear: although 
positive results using active neuroimaging para-
digms can provide direct evidence for residual con-
sciousness, negative results can never exclude the 
possibility that the patient retains awareness of self 
or environment.
Passive paradigms have a longer history than their 
active counterparts in the neuroimaging assessment 
of patients with disorders of consciousness. They 
allow a global assessment of the patients’ residu-
al brain function, without requiring the patients’ 
explicit collaboration. For this reason, they can pro-
vide information on brain activity and the potential 
for consciousness in each and every patient studied. 
They also allow, at least in principle, that the neural 
mechanisms underlying consciousness per se may 
not be identical to those mechanisms supporting 
explicit report, verbal or otherwise (Block, 2007, 
Hulme 2009, Lamme, 2010).
Passive neuroimaging paradigms, as used in the 
current literature, encompass a large variety of 
approaches which aim at identifying differences in 
brain function between MCS and VS. Early resting 
state PET studies identified a global dysfunction of 
a bilateral fronto-parietal thalamo-cortical network 
in patients in a VS as compared to controls (Laureys 
et al., 1999), later found to be relatively more pre-
served in patients in MCS (Laureys et  al., 2004). 
PET studies investigating responses to external 
stimuli found a pattern of localized response and 
functional disconnection in patients in a VS as com-
pared to controls (Laureys et al., 2000; 2002), while 
MCS patients showed a near-to-normal response 
(Boly et  al., 2004; 2008a). Resting state fMRI 
studies identified impaired thalamo-cortical con-
nectivity in the default network (Boly et al., 2009b; 
Vanhaudenhuyse et  al., 2010) and other networks 
(Zhou et  al., 2010) in coma and VS as compared 
to controls. As compared to VS patients, MCS 
patients showed stronger precuneus involvement in 
the default network (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). 
Collectively, these findings show preserved brain 
function in MCS as compared to VS, in line with 
recent reports of better preserved cerebral struc-
tural integrity in this patient population (Fernandez-
Espejo et al., 2010; 2011).
Currently, however, passive paradigms do not allow 
a differentiation of VS from MCS at the individual 
level (though see Fernandez-Espejo et  al., 2011). 
Most studies comparing MCS to VS patients have 
been performed at the group level, and did not sys-
tematically investigate the inter-subject variability 
in the brain activity criteria observed. Furthermore, 
fMRI studies have shown that it is possible to elicit 
activation of associative cortices in response to exter-
nal stimulation in individual VS patients (Di et al., 
2007; Rodriguez Moreno et al., 2010), complicating 
the interpretation of passively acquired fMRI data. 
Ultimately, as discussed below, further research on 
neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is needed 
to bring passive neuroimaging paradigms closer to 
diagnostic value.
An alternative passive approach is to use behavioural 
or autonomic markers which reliably differentiate 
conscious and unconscious conditions in healthy 
controls. For example, several studies indicate that 
consciousness is needed in order to learn ‘trace 
conditioning’ contingencies, in which there is delay 
separating the end of the CS (conditioned stimulus) 
from the start of the US (unconditioned stimulus), 
but is not needed to learn ‘delay conditioning’ con-
tingencies (in which the CS and US overlap) (Clark 
and Squire, 1998; Manns et al., 2000). Bekinschtein 
and colleagues exploited this observation to exam-
ine whether trace conditioning could be learned 
under anaesthesia and by patients in VS and MCS 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2009a). Using anticipatory elec-
tromyographical responses as an indicator of learn-
ing during eyeblink conditioning, they found that the 
degree of learning was a good indicator of recovery 
in patients; however, the method failed to provide 
a clean separation of conscious and (anaestheti-
cally) unconscious control subjects; some conscious 
controls failed to learn and one unconscious con-
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trol showed marginal learning while under general 
anaesthesia. In another example, Scott et  al. (Scott 
et al., 2010) showed, using healthy controls, that a 
simple paradigm involving exposure to predictable 
versus unpredictable sound sequences clearly dif-
ferentiated conscious from unconscious conditions 
(they used inattention as a proxy for unconscious-
ness), assessed via skin conductance responses. 
Their procedure, termed the ‘learned aversive con-
tingency’ (LAC) procedure, is currently being tested 
in patients. An advantage to these approaches is that 
they can be assessed by very simple methods (e.g., 
galvanic skin response) in contrast to requiring an 
MRI scanner. These paradigms have however to be 
better validated at the individual level before one 
can assess of their clinical utility.
What validates the use of a passive paradigm? 
One answer is that a passive paradigm is valid 
if, in healthy controls, it unambiguously differ-
entiates conscious from unconscious conditions 
(Bekinschtein et  al., 2009a; Scott et  al., 2010). 
However, while this is a useful practical heuristic 
it overlooks the obvious fact that brain damaged 
patients have abnormal brains, so that what may be 
a clear differentiation in healthy controls may not be 
so clear in patients. Ultimately, in the absence of a 
consensus regarding the neural mechanisms under-
lying consciousness, passive paradigms cannot lead 
to a direct diagnosis of the presence or absence of 
cognition in individual patients. Research on passive 
paradigms and NCCs thus go hand-in-hand (Seth 
et  al., 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2008), advancing 
both the global study of brain function in disorders 
of consciousness, and the investigation of the links 
between brain activity and consciousness in the 
normal human brain. Such an approach facilitates 
a transition from ‘exploratory’ to ‘explanatory’ 
NCCs; where the latter refers to brain processes that 
do not merely correlate with but actually account 
for fundamental phenomenological properties of 
conscious experience (Tononi and Koch, 2008; 
Seth, 2009). This mechanistic understanding would 
not only allow more confidence in the diagnosis, but 
also the development of new therapeutic strategies 
in individual brain damaged patients.
To advance mechanistic understanding, a com-
bination of theory and experiment is required. 
Theoretical approaches allow taking some distance 
from the data and building a conceptual description 
of how phenomenal experience could be generated 
as a consequence of different patterns of neural 
activity. With regard to experiment, restricting 
investigation to only one mode of altered conscious-
ness can induce bias in the search for truly explana-
tory NCCs (Boly et  al., 2009a) because patterns 
of brain activity can differ substantially among 
modes of unconsciousness (Brown et al., 2010). For 
example, global brain metabolism and functional 
brain connectivity seem to be markedly decreased in 
conditions such as coma, anaesthesia, or sleep, while 
they are paradoxically increased in some other con-
ditions such as generalized tonico-clonic seizures 
and some forms of temporal lobe epilepsy (Arthuis 
et al., 2009). Similarly, EEG high frequency activity 
(e.g. in the beta and gamma bands) decreases dur-
ing non rapid eye movement (REM) sleep (Nishida 
et  al., 2005; Corsi-Cabrera et  al., 2006) but can 
increase during anesthesia-induced loss of con-
sciousness (LOC) (Murphy et al., 2011). Theoretical 
approaches to explanatory NCCs should therefore 
encompass a broad view of the different states of 
altered states of consciousness (Boly et al., 2008b), 
in order to potentially identify common underlying 
mechanisms. Combined with further experiments 
comparing brain function in conscious and uncon-
scious states, the specification of explanatory NCCs 
could motivate a broader use of passive paradigms 
as diagnostic tools in patients with disorders of con-
sciousness (Table I).
In the next section, we briefly review some concep-
tual issues in the identification of explanatory NCCs 
in the human brain, in the context of several promi-
nent current theories of consciousness. We conclude 
by describing further research avenues potentially 
relevant to the study of brain function in brain dam-
aged patients, and on correlates of consciousness in 
a larger, theoretically informed context.
Models: Explanatory NCCs
and theories of consciousness
Two general approaches to the study of NCCs can 
be distinguished: (i) those that contrast consciously 
perceived stimuli against those perceived only sub-
liminally, usually in healthy volunteers (i.e., con-
scious content), and (ii) those that contrast different 
global states of consciousness (i.e., conscious level; 
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examples include normal waking consciousness, 
sleep, anaesthesia, VS, MCS, and so on) (Seth 
et al., 2008; Hohwy, 2009). Example approaches to 
studying content NCCs include masking, binocular 
rivalry, continuous flash suppression paradigms, or 
studies of motion-induced blindness, change blind-
ness or inattentional blindness (for reviews see 
(Seth et al., 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2008)). Studies 
using these paradigms are almost always modality-
specific, meaning they focus on auditory or visual 
modalities, or other specific aspects of cognition 
such as emotion, memory or language embedded in 
a specific sensory modality. Such studies have deliv-
ered many important insights into content NCCs, 
for example identifying general mechanisms such as 
the involvement of fronto-parietal cortices (Dehaene 
et  al., 2006; Pollen, 2011), or the importance of 
long-latency ERP components (Del Cul,et al., 2007) 
and recurrent feedback processes (Lamme, 2006; 
2010). An important issue raised by these studies, 
discussed further below, is whether these NCCs 
have to do with consciousness per se, or to do with 
the reportability of conscious experiences.
Disorders such as VS and MCS seem to involve not 
so much disturbances of specific content NCCs, but 
rather a more pervasive and non-modality-specific 
impairment of consciousness. While zero conscious 
level does imply a complete absence of conscious 
contents, inferences from conscious contents to 
conscious level are harder to make. For example, 
it seems possible to be highly conscious of some 
stimuli while being completely unconscious of oth-
ers (Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010). In addition, 
there is abundant and accumulating evidence that 
many processes tied to specific conscious contents, 
or even dimensions of conscious contents (e.g., 
experiences of agency, volition, or subjective real-
ity) can be dissociated from consciousness per se 
(Tononi and Koch, 2008; Boly,et al., 2009a). These 
lines of evidence are summarized in Table II. Given 
these dissociations, it makes sense to search for 
indicators of conscious level that pertain to all con-
scious scenes, as far as possible independent from 
their specific contents. In other words, one could see 
a normal level of consciousness as a state making 
all sorts of conscious contents potentially available 
(repertoire), while not all cognitive functions or 
perception modalities are present to consciousness 
at a given time. Experimentally, this more global 
approach has been employed when investigating 
brain function in altered consciousness states such 
as coma, VS, MCS, epilepsy, sleep or anaesthesia. 
In these experiments, researchers investigate the dif-
ference between the presence and absence of generic 
ability to have conscious experience. This approach 
can seem at a first glance slightly simplistic, how-
ever comparing different altered states of conscious-
ness and identifying common mechanisms renders 
it complex and challenging. Though content-based 
and level-based NCC investigations are complemen-
tary and certainly both useful, they do ask radically 
different questions. Generic theories of conscious-
ness should however in principle address both of 
these topics in conjunction.
Block (2009) provides a useful differentiation of 
current theoretical frameworks of consciousness 
into three categories: biological theories, higher-
order thought theories, and global workspace/infor-
mation integration theories. (We note that the latter 
two categories are also ‘biological’ inasmuch as the 
corresponding theories do recognize that conscious-
ness is instantiated by brains, however their key con-
cepts are functional.) Biological theories postulate 
that consciousness is some sort of biological state 
of the brain. Quite what biological state or states 
count as conscious is of course not yet understood. 
Table I. - Active versus passive paradigms: pros and cons.
Active paradigms Passive paradigms
If positive responses, directly usable information on the 
conscious state of the patient
Not directly usable for single-subject diagnosis at present.
If negative response, no conclusion possible Requires parallel research on NCC and theories of 
consciousness to support interpretation.
Requires patient’s collaboration Does not require patient’s collaboration
Negative response in ~90% patients Information on the patient’s brain function obtained in 
every case
 MODES AND MODELS IN CONSCIOUSNESS SCIENCE 177
Candidates include proposals linking consciousness 
to gamma band activity (Llinas et al., 1998), recur-
rent processing (Lamme, 2006) or long-distance 
connectivity or synchrony (Melloni et al., 2007). A 
distinguishing feature of biological theories is that 
they allow for conscious contents to exist without 
these contents necessarily being reportable; or, to 
put it more strongly, subjects could have phenome-
nally conscious states that the subject does not know 
about or have ‘access’ to (Block, 2007; Hulme et al., 
2009; Lamme, 2010). In Block’s terminology, bio-
logical theories allow a distinction between phenom-
enal consciousness and access consciousness. This 
distinction has important implications for diagnosis 
of residual consciousness. Non-reportable conscious 
contents (i.e. contents which are phenomenally con-
scious but not access conscious) are by definition 
beyond the reach of active paradigms, which require 
subjects to make (non-behavioural) reports based on 
access. [An interesting middle ground may involve 
dissociations between conscious contents and con-
scious selfhood. For example, people with pain 
asymbolia (Aydede, 2005). A critical and quasi-his-
torical essay on theories of pain. Pain: New essays 
on its nature and the methodology of its study. M. 
Aydede. Cambridge, MA, MIT press.) claim to have 
pain experiences but do not mind having these expe-
riences, sometimes describing the pain as painful for 
someone else. Possibly such dissociated conscious 
contents could still be reportable]. Only passive 
paradigms could in principle detect such contents. 
However, as mentioned above, in order to do so one 
first needs to understand what biological states or 
processes count as conscious.
According to higher-order thought (HOT) theories, 
a mental state is conscious when a person is actu-
Table II. - Level versus content: current evidence for the fact that consciousness per se can be dissociated from content-
specific sensory or cognitive processes in the human brain. Most references cite studies showing the continued presence of 
consciousness in the absence of a specific process; those marked with a * show that a particular process which is usually 
conscious can also occur in the absence of consciousness.
Processes that can be dissociated 
from consciousness 
Practical examples References 
Sensori-motor interaction with 
environment
Dream consciousness
Locked-in syndrome
(Nir and Tononi, 2010)
(Laureys et al., 2005)
Visual perception Cortical blindness (Miller 1982)
Tactile sense - Sense of body Loss of proprioception, deafferentation (Gallagher and Cole, 1995; Blanke 
et al., 2002)
Language Aphasic patients - Wada test (Trenerry and Loring, 1995)
Sense of space Balint syndrome, neglect (Phan et al., 2000; Vallar, 2007)
First person perspective from within the 
body
Out of body experiences (Blanke et al., 2002; Lenggenhager 
et al., 2007)
Episodic memory Globally Amnesic patients (Bartsch and Deuschl, 2010)
Declarative memory* Subliminal declarative memory 
processes
(Reder et al., 2009; Henke 2010)
Working memory* Implicit working memory processes (Hassin et al., 2009)
Sense of self – introspection or 
reflection
Loss of self awareness while watching 
a deeply absorbing movie
(Goldberg et al., 2006)
Sense of subjective reality of world 
and/or of self
Depersonalization and derealization; 
Cotard’s delusion
(Phillips et al., 2001; Pearn and 
Gardner-Thorpe, 2002; Sierra, 2009)
Attention (1) Consciousness without attention – 
perception of peripheral visual field
(Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Van Boxtel 
et al., 2010)
Attention (2)* Attention without consciousness – 
possibility of cerebral treatment of 
attended subliminal stimuli
(Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Van Boxtel 
et al., 2010)
Volition (1) Consciousness without volition: 
akinetic mutism
(Marin and Wilkosz, 2005)
Volition (2)* Intention without consciousness (Libet, Gleason et al., 1983; Soon et al., 
2008)
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ally aware, or disposed towards being aware, of 
being in that state; either by directly perceiving it, 
or by thinking about it (Rosenthal, 2000; 2005). For 
example, on HOT theories the conscious experience 
of red consists in a first-order neural representation 
of red (probably in the visual system) accompanied 
by a perception or thought (possibly originating in 
frontal cortices), directed at that representation, with 
the content that the subject is having the experience 
of red. HOT theories offer an attractive epistemo-
logical simplicity, since being conscious of X is now 
equivalent to having a HOT potentially allowing 
communication/report of that fact; in other words, 
consciousness implies access. However, HOT theo-
ries arguably underestimate the richness of primary, 
phenomenal consciousness by asserting that compo-
nents of conscious scenes are necessarily accompa-
nied by HOTs. With respect to diagnosing residual 
consciousness, HOT theories suffer the opposite 
problem to biological theories. Whereas biological 
theories allow for non-reportable conscious contents 
but (as yet) provide insufficient criteria for their 
identification, HOT theories rule out such experi-
ences by theoretical fiat. Consider the important 
example of pain: even if patients are not able to 
report it, the existence of a conscious pain sensation 
is a, if not the, crucial matter from the perspective of 
proper diagnosis and clinical management.
The final frameworks, global workspace and infor-
mation integration theories, are in our view more 
relevant in the context of patients with disorders of 
consciousness though they are not without their own 
problems. Global workspace theory (GWT) was 
introduced by Baars (Baars, 1988) and can be viewed 
as a ‘theatre’ metaphor of mental function ing (Baars 
and Laureys, 2005). According to Baars et al. (2003), 
once conscious sensory content is established, it is 
distributed widely to a decentralized ‘‘audience’’ 
of expert networks – executive interpreters, involv-
ing parietal and prefrontal cortices. GWT has been 
developed in a more neural direction by Dehaene, 
Naccache, and Changeux (Dehaene and Naccache, 
2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2004; 2005; Dehaene 
et  al., 2006) and by Shanahan (Shanahan, 2008). 
In terms of empirical data relevant to conscious 
content, GWT predicts that conscious per ception 
should involve widespread brain sources, and uncon-
scious sensory processing should be much more 
limited (Baars, 2005). Regarding overall conscious 
level, loss of consciousness in states like coma, 
VS, sleep, and anaesthesia should be accompanied 
by decreased activity in ‘‘observing self’’ fronto-
parietal regions (Baars et  al., 2003). In addition to 
fronto-parietal activity, these authors suggested that 
the level of consciousness should be determined by 
the amount of spontaneous fast frequency oscillatory 
activity in the thalamo-cor tical system (Dehaene 
and Changeux, 2005). A disadvantage of GWT is 
that, like HOT theories, it is primarily a theory of 
conscious access rather than of phenomenal con-
sciousness. On GWT, phenomenal consciousness 
consists in the process of global broadcast, which 
entails access. Thus, like HOT theories, GWT may 
be insensitive to non-reportable conscious experi-
ences, should they exist. GWT does however have 
the advantage of attempting to make empirical pre-
dictions, providing a potentially useful foothold for 
clinical application. Future developments of GWT in 
this regard could focus on: i) unpacking, functionally 
and mechanistically, the crucial concept of ‘broad-
cast’ in the genesis of conscious experience (i.e., 
what exactly is broadcast, and how does it happen?); 
and ii) leveraging the useful discussions of the role 
of context in shaping workspace contents, a rich but 
usually overlooked aspect of Baars’ original theory 
(Baars, 1988).
Information integration theories, such as Tononi’s 
‘information integration theory of consciousness’ 
(IITC, (Tononi, 2008)) and Tononi and Edelman’s 
previous ‘dynamic core hypothesis’ (Tononi and 
Edelman, 1998) start from a different intuition. In 
contrast to GWT, these theories do not focus on 
access consciousness; they have the more global-
ist aim of explaining links between brain activity 
and the emergence of any kind of conscious con-
tents. Information integration theories emphasize the 
dynamical complexity of conscious scenes, namely 
that conscious scenes are simultaneously integrated 
(i.e., they are experienced ‘all of a piece’) and dif-
ferentiated (i.e., each conscious scene is one among 
a vast repertoire of possible conscious scenes). 
Therefore, the occurrence of any particular con-
scious experience generates an enormous quantity 
of information by ruling out a vast repertoire of 
alternative possibilities (differentiation) and because 
each scene is integrated, this is information for the 
system (i.e., not for an observer of the system, as 
might be the case, for example, for a digital camera). 
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Theories of this kind predict that conscious level 
will be associated with a measure of ‘dynamical 
complexity’ tracking coexisting differentiation and 
integration, applied to the relevant neural variables. 
If true, then such measures could be useful when 
applied to neural data recorded from patients in the 
context of passive paradigms.
A first way to check these predictions empirically was 
provided by the combination or transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) with recordings using high-density 
EEG. An early study (Massimini et al., 2005) showed 
that TMS pulses administered during slow wave sleep 
evoked activity only local to the TMS focus; in con-
trast, TMS applied during conscious wakefulness led 
to a spatiotemporally complex pattern of activity with 
several distinct components over time, consistent 
with a rich underlying effective and functional con-
nectivity. This paradigm has recently been validated 
in other states of altered consciousness, conditions 
including anaesthesia (Ferrarelli et  al., 2010) and 
REM sleep (Massimini et  al., 2010). In each case, 
putatively unconscious conditions led to evoked 
responses similar to those observed during slow wave 
sleep; by contrast, the REM sleep condition was very 
similar to normal conscious wakefulness. Perhaps 
the most promising aspect of this approach is that it 
leverages theoretical work linking consciousness with 
high levels of dynamical complexity in the underlying 
neuronal networks. This provides the hope to better 
differentiate conscious from unconscious patients at 
the individual level (Massimini et  al., 2009). TMS-
EEG studies in VS and MCS patients are currently 
ongoing.
The use of neuroimaging methods as a diagnostic 
tools would benefit from the ability to summarize 
results in a simple score (number), as a very generic 
measure. In the context of TMS-EEG, the use of the 
response entropy or algorithmic complexity has been 
proposed (Massimini et  al., 2009) and is currently 
being evaluated. Several other theoretically-ground-
ed candidate measures also exist for characterising 
dynamical complexity in neural data. The earliest 
was ‘neural complexity’ (Tononi and Edelman, 
1998) which is determined by the average mutual 
information among subsets of all possible sizes for 
all bipartitions of a system. This measure has been 
criticized however for not reflecting causal interac-
tions (mutual information is a symmetric measure 
of general statistical dependence). Addressing this, 
Tononi introduced the measure ‘integrated informa-
tion’ (Φ, Tononi, 2004)) which measures the infor-
mation generated when a system transitions from 
one state to the next (differentiation), to the extent 
that this information is generated by the whole sys-
tem and not by the parts considered independently 
(integration). This measure forms the cornerstone 
of Tononi’s IITC according to which consciousness 
is considered as a ‘capacity’ or ‘potential’ (Tononi, 
2005). Φ however is to date difficult or infeasible 
to calculate for nontrivial systems [though see a 
recent adaptation (Barrett and Seth, 2011) which 
is computable from general time series data and 
conceives of integrated information as a ‘process’ 
rather than as a ‘capacity/potential’]. A third mea-
sure, ‘causal density’, reflects the overall density of 
causal interactions among elements (or bipartitions) 
of system (Seth et al., 2006; 2011) using a statisti-
cal measure of causality based on precedence and 
relative predictability. Causal density entails fewer 
assumptions on the data and, in contrast to Tononi’s 
Φ, reflects a process rather than a capacity. It bears 
emphasizing that these measures, while all opera-
tionalizing dynamical complexity, do so in different 
ways which have substantial implications for how 
consciousness is conceptualized (e.g., as a capacity, 
or as a process) (Seth et al., 2011).
In contrast to (Block’s) biological theories, GWT 
and information integration theories are essentially 
functionalist; it is conceivable that machines or 
other systems could incorporate global workspace 
architectures and/or generate high levels of dynamic 
complexity. Unlike GWT, information integration 
theories are theories of phenomenal as well as access 
consciousness; content will be conscious if it is 
subtended by neural dynamics with sufficiently high 
dynamical complexity; access will ensue if these 
processes incorporate neural mechanisms associated 
with broadcast and reportability. Also, information 
integration theories and GWT make different pre-
dictions regarding empirical data. For instance, on 
information integration theories widespread activity 
has to be complex in order to furnish both integration 
and differentiation, a requirement that is not explicit 
in GWT (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008). Evidence on 
this point is clear: under some circumstances wide-
spread activity can actually signify absence of con-
sciousness, for example during hypersynchronous 
states associated with epileptic absence seizures 
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(Arthuis et al., 2009). While the loss of conscious-
ness in this condition has a natural interpretation in 
terms of information integration theories (loss of dif-
ferentiation), GWT theories would need to postulate 
additional mechanisms (e.g., that hypersynchronous 
activity may somehow ‘block access’ to the global 
workspace) to potentially account for loss of con-
sciousness (Boly et al., 2009a). In general, informa-
tion integration theories successfully retrodict that 
patterns of brain activity such as very low neuronal 
firing/connectivity, hyperactivity/hypersynchrony, 
and bistable dynamics are especially unfavourable 
for the brain to generate meaningful levels of con-
sciousness (Tononi, 2008; Barrett and Seth, 2011). 
These theories are also highly consistent with the 
TMS-EEG evidence discussed earlier (see above) 
inasmuch as spatiotemporally complex responses to 
TMS pulses suggest an underlying functional con-
nectivity with high, or potentially high, integrated 
information or causal density. An explicit quantita-
tive connection between TMS-EEG data and these 
quantities is still however lacking, though research 
on this topic is presently ongoing (Table III).
Conclusion and Perspectives
While active paradigms have considerable clinical 
and ethical relevance, work on these paradigms has to 
be paired with further research on passive paradigms 
and neural correlates of consciousness. Combining 
the results of different neuroimaging modalities, as 
well as the use of computational modelling, could 
also furnish new insights into how biological mecha-
nisms are translated into neural activity patterns 
potentially underlying conscious contents. Although 
model-based and relying on a number of underly-
ing assumptions, computational modelling is cur-
rently very well placed to take advantage of advances 
in neuroscience and neuroanatomy, as well as of 
new information technology developments such as 
the adaptation of graphics processing units (GPUs) 
to implement desktop parallel computing capable 
of simulating large scale realistic brain models 
(Izhikevich and Edelman, 2008; Nageswaran et  al., 
2009; Ching et al., 2010). Data-informed approaches 
such as Dynamic Causal Modelling (Friston et  al., 
2003; David et  al., 2006) and Granger causality 
(Granger, 1969; Seth, 2010), which attempt to infer 
the underlying neural mechanisms generating brain 
signals in a given data set, could provide a bridge 
between modelling and experimental evidence in 
order to gain further insights into the links between 
brain signals, neuronal activity and consciousness 
(Boly et  al., 2011). Multi-centric studies on larger 
groups of patients (Monti et al., 2010), as well as their 
testing in other conditions such as anaesthesia and 
sleep (Boly et al., 2008b), are also warranted in order 
to better evaluate the diagnostic and prognostic value 
of the different paradigms in use. Finally, a better 
understanding of lesion patterns and associated clini-
cal and prognostic states could improve mechanistic 
Table III. - Predictions of each theory and remaining issues. HOT: Higher Order Thought; LOC: loss of consciousness.
Theories Predictions Remaining issues
Biological Depending on the theory: 1) Fast gam-
ma activity; 2) Widespread activation/
connectivity; 3) Recurrent processing
Verify that the biological mechanisms hold in 
each and every conscious state, as compa-
red to unconscious states.
HOT Higher order activity should be in-
volved in each and every conscious 
perception
Accounts for access consciousness but no 
account for phenomenal consciousness. 
More precise predictions to be generated - 
not biologically rooted yet. What is the neural 
correlate of a HOT?
Global workspace Generally widespread activity and fast 
background activity (Baars); activation 
of higher order fronto-parietal cortices 
(Dehaene and colleagues)
More precise predictions to be generated; 
theory needs to be refined to account for 
widespread activity during LOC. Also, em-
phasis is on access rather than phenomenal 
consciousness.
Information integration theories Consciousness should be absent if: 
bistable dynamics; hypo/hyper activity 
and/or connectivity
More precise predictions to be generated 
- not sufficiently biologically rooted and 
proposed measures are hard to calculate in 
practice.
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understanding of the link between consciousness and 
the brain (Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2010). Ultimately, 
however, we stand in need of progress on the differ-
ent theories of consciousness in order to render them 
more precise, such that they furnish predictions that 
can be tested on actual brain data in a way that allows 
their refinement, confirmation, or rejection. Ideally, 
theoretical advances will furnish explanatory cor-
relates of consciousness that have sufficient general-
ity and explanatory power that they can support the 
confident use of passive paradigms as diagnostic tools 
in patients with disorders of consciousness. Such 
theoretically grounded and experimentally validated 
passive paradigms are greatly to be desired since 
they circumvent the limitations of active paradigms 
in relying on patient comprehension and cooperation.
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